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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The 180-day statute of limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) is 
superceded by Notice of Claim provisions at UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 
(2004) under Hall v. Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court accords no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law and reviews them for correctness. 
Buckner v. Kennard. Sheriff of Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 78; 99 P.3d 842. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: Plaintiff cited Hall v. State 
Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958, in the Complaint [Par. 
9, R. 13] as standing for the proposition that Notice of Claim provisions at 
UCA Chap. 63-30, now 63-30d, apply herein under the holding in that case. 
2. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the facts 1-16 in 
the defendants' statement of facts that are deemed admitted by rule CJA 4-
501 [now URCP 7] did not settle the question and require the court to engage 
in further impermissible fact-finding and to apply an incorrect legal standard. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98. 
-1-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under UCA Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The 180-day statute of limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) is 
superceded by Notice of Claim provisions at UCA Sec. 63-30d-402 and 403 
(2004) under Hall v. Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court accords no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law and reviews them for correctness. 
Buckner v. Kennard. Sheriff of Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 78; 99 P.3d 842. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: Plaintiff cited Hall v. State 
Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958, in the Complaint [Par. 
9, R. 13] as standing for the proposition that Notice of Claim provisions at 
UCA Sec. 63-30, now 63-30d, apply herein under the holding in that case. 
2. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the facts 1- 16 in 
the defendants' statement of facts that are deemed admitted by rule CJA 4-
501 [now URCP 7] did not settle the question and require the court to engage 
in further impermissible feet-finding and to apply an incorrect legal standard. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98. 
-1-
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum. 
[R. 131] ["(Defendants' motion seeks to have mis court give weight to 
certain portions of plaintiff's deposition testimony while giving less, httle, or 
no eight to the other portions of that testimony, while at the same time seeking 
to have this court draw inferences from plaintiff's deposition testimony in the 
light most favorable to the defendants. This court lacks any authority to 
weigh evidence or adjudge disputed inferences in that manner via such a 
pretrial motion for summary judgment."] [R. 133] ["This court lacks 
authority to weigh evidence or draw inferences unfavorable to the non-
moving party at this stage."] [R.132] 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that mere is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. [Emphasis added.] 
• • • 
( e ) . . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response. [Emphasis added.] 
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URCP 7 [Similar to Repealed CJA 4-5011. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which 
the moving parry contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving parry's memorandum 
is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless controverted by the responding party. 
UCA Sec. 67-21-3. Reporting of governmental waste or 
violations of law — Employer action — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an 
employee because the employee... communicates in good faith 
the existence of any waste of pubhc funds, property, or manpower, 
or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or regulation 
adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this 
state, or any recognized entity of the United States, 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to 
have communicated in good faith if he gives written notice or 
otherwise formally communicates the waste, violation, or 
reasonable suspicion to the state auditor. This presumption may be 
rebutted by showing that the employee knew or reasonably ought to 
have known that the report is malicious, false, or frivolous. 
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies that 
unreasonably restrict an employee's ability to document the 
existence of any waste of pubhc funds, property, or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of any laws, rules, or regulations. 
-3-
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof 
required. 
(1) As used in this section, "damages" means damages for injury 
or loss caused by each violation of mis chapter. 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring 
a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or 
both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation 
of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought in the 
district court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, 
the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the 
person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his 
principal place of business. 
(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this 
section, the employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the employee has suffered an adverse action 
because the employee, or a person acting on his behalf engaged or 
intended to engage in an activity protected under Section 67-21-3. 
63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim. 
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
person and according to the requirements of Section 63-30d-401 
within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
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63-30d-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by 
governmental entity or insurance carrier within 60 
days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the 
claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied. 
[Ninety Days Under Prior Law Before July 1,2004 Re-enactment.] 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day 
period, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to 
approve or deny the claim. [Ninety Days Under Prior Law Before 
July 1,2004 Re-enactment.] 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the 
district court against the governmental entity or an employee of the 
entity. 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of 
the claim or within one year after the denial period specified in mis 
chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintifi7Appellant Charles Douglas Fannen is a deputy sheriff who was 
formerly employed as a police officer by defendant City of Lehi. He brought 
Whistle Blower and other claims in this action against defendant City of Lehi, 
its city manager, its chief of police, a police lieutenant, and four police 
sergeants. [R. 15] Defendants took Deputy Fannen's deposition and then 
moved for summary judgment based on selected admissions that were made 
by Deputy Fannen in his deposition. [R. 87] Deputy Fannen moved to strike 
the motion for summary judgment and its supporting memorandum. [R. 131] 
The motion to strike objected to defendants' entire filing as failing to 
properly make a showing of entitlement to summary judgment under the rules. 
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The trial court denied Deputy Fannen's motion to strike and granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. [R. 166] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are facts 1 -16 that were deemed admitted by rule: 
1. Deputy Fannen officially started work as a police officer for the Lehi 
City police department on April 27,1998. Prior to that time, beginning in 
July of 1997, he worked for Lehi City as a reserve police officer, 
pefendants' Statement of Facts, R. 126] 
2. Approximately four to five months after he started as a police 
officer, in about July or August of 1998, Deputy Fannen started receiving 
flyers in his mailbox at work making derogatory comments and jokes about 
him and/or his wife. [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.126] 
3. In approximately December of 1998, Deputy Fannen anonymously 
contacted the Workers Compensation Fund Fraud Investigation Department to 
report what he alleged was a fraudulent workers compensation claim made by 
Defendant Sergeant James Munson, also a Lehi City employee. [Defendants' 
Statement of Facts, R.126] 
4. Deputy Fannen made the report because he thought the department 
through Chief of Police and Defendant Karl Zimmerman was "covering up" 
for Defendant Munson. Pefendants' Statement of Facts, R.126] 
5. In late fall of 1999, Deputy Fannen went to Chief Zimmerman, 
showed him the notes he had received in his mailbox, and requested Chief 
Zimmerman do an investigation and address it at the next department 
meeting, which Zimmerman did. Pefendants' Statement of Facts, R.125] 
-6-
6. After the department meeting, the notes stopped for more than one-
and-one-half years. Then in approximately May of 2001, Deputy Fannen 
received another note in his mailbox stating "leave . . . leave . . .leave." 
(Defendants' Statement of Facts, R. 125] 
7. After the "leave . . . leave . . .leave" note, Chief Zimmerman called a 
follow up department meeting during which he stated to the department 
members that the notes better stop and that if it ever happened again, every 
department member would undergo a lie detector test, including Fannen and 
even Chief Zimmerman himself. [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R. 125] 
8. Deputy Fannen does not know who left the notes in his mailbox. 
When asked during his deposition if he was accusing Defendant Munson of 
leaving the notes, he responded: "I do not know who did it.. .1 do not know -
who did it." [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.125] 
9. In approximately May of 2001, Deputy Fannen was traveling to 
Colorado when some truck drivers on the highway made him angry, at which 
time Deputy Fannen flashed his police badge at the truckers. [Defendants' 
Statement of Facts, R.125] 
10. On June 20,2001, Deputy Fannen was asked to resign and did 
resign. Deputy Fannen's last day of work with Lehi City was June 20,2001. 
However, his salary and benefits continued to September 30,2001. 
[Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.124] 
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11. Deputy Fannen was told the reason the department wanted his 
resignation was because of the incident with the truckers in Colorado. 
[Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.124] 
12. Deputy Fannen acknowledges that the emotional distress he claims 
to have suffered as a result of defendants' alleged actions ended on the date 
he resigned June 20,2001. pefendants' Statement of Facts, R.124] 
13. Deputy Fannen testified that he had a good reputation as 
a police officer and although he believes the defendants attempted to 
ruin his reputation, they did not succeed in doing so. [Defendants' 
Statement of Facts, R.124] 
14. On December 9,2001, Deputy Fannen was hired as a police 
officer by the Alpine/Highland police department. [Defendants' Statement 
of Facts, R.124] 
15. When he applied for a position with the Alpine/Highland police 
department, Deputy Fannen had to undergo both a written and verbal 
psychological evaluation and never mentioned on either that he was suffering 
any emotional distress. [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.124] 
16. On February 4,2002, Deputy Fannen filed a Notice of Claim with 
Lehi City. [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.123] 
The following additional factsWalso of-record: 
17. Lehi City did not accept, deny, or respond to the Notice of Claim 
within ninety days after February 4,2002. [Complaint. Par. 9, R. 13] 
18. The Complaint was filed on June 10,2002. [R. 15] 
»o* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The 180-day statute of limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) is 
superceded by Notice of Claim provisions at UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 
(2004) under Hall v. Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958. 
2. Summary judgment was not appropriate because the facts 1-16 in 
the defendants' statement of facts mat are deemed admitted by rule CJA 4-
501 [now URCP 7] did not settle the question and require the court to engage 
in further impermissible fact-finding and to apply an incorrect legal standard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS AT UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 
(2004) APPLY TO AND WERE COMPLIED WITH IN THIS ACTION 
The 180-day Whistle Blower statute of limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-
4(2) (2004) is superceded by the Notice of Claim provisions now appearing 
at UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 (2004) under Hall v. Department of 
Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958. That case holds that the Notice of 
Claim provisions must be applied in cases such as the case at bar brought 
under the Whistle Blower Act. Mr. Stanton had to commence this Whistle 
Blower action within 180 days of September 30,2001, since defendants' 
moving papers show that is the date thatthe resignation was effective. A 
February 4,2002, filing of this lawsuit would have been timely. But he could 
not file until he had complied with all the Notice of Claim provisions. So Mr. 
Stanton filed the Notice of Claim on February 4,2004. That took him beyond 
the 180-day filing limit because of the ninety [now sixty] day waiting period. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that the time period began running on June 20, 
2001, as contended by defendants, Mr. Stanton had until June 20,2002, to 
file the Notice of Claim. He filed it on February 4,2002. Since there was no 
response to that Notice of Claim, the window of time for Mr. Stanton to file 
mis action in district court ran from May 3,2002, to May 3,2003. The filing 
of this case on June 10,2002, was well within the one-year window. In order 
to apply the Notice of Claim provisions to a Whistle Blower case as required 
under Hall v. Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958, the 180-
day filing deadline at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) must yield as superceded. 
POINT TWO 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 1- 16 DO NOT SETTLE THE QUESTION 
AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS NOT "MADE 
AND SUPPORTED AS PROVIDED IN THIS RULE" URCP 56(e) 
Facts 1-16 are the facts deemed undisputed by rule. They do not settle 
the question or establish an entitlement to summary judgment. Exhibits A and 
B contain papers that were not properly authenticated. Thus, the motion for 
summary judgment is not one "made and supported as provided in this rule" 
as contemplated under URCP 56(e) and it should not be treated as such. 
Deputy Fannen did not waive these defects, but filed a timely motion to 
strike the defendants' entire summary judgment filing as inadequate. [R. 131] 
Instead of granting the motion to strike, the trial court denied it, but 
men refused to allow Deputy Fannen to rely on the contents of Exhibits A and 
B, since they were not properly authenticated. For example, the resignation 
letter dated June 20,2001, that was included defendants' Exhibits A and B 
[Deposition Exhibit 15; Summary Judgment Exhibit B; R. 88] is addressed to 
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the City Administrator and states the resignation is "effective as of 
September 30,2001" and states "(w)e have agreed that my salary and 
benefits will continue to September 30,2001, unchanged from my current 
status." Even though the defendants included that letter in their summary 
judgment Exhibits A and B [at R. 88], and the court refused to grant Deputy 
Fannen's motion to strike it, when Deputy Fannen relied upon the letter, the 
trial court refused to consider it because it was not "supported as provided in 
this rule." [URCP 56(e)] [The court wrote: "Plaintiff relies upon a letter he 
fails to authenticate by either affidavit or discovery record. Absent such 
authentication, the Court may not consider the letter. By contrast, Defendants 
attached to their memorandum the deposition record of Plaintiff's testimony, 
in which plaintiff clearly states, under oath, that he left the Lehi Police 
Department on June 20,2001. Deposition of Charles Douglas Fannen, 
Volume II, Pg. 353."] [R. 204] The trial court gave great weight to an 
unauthenticated deposition transcript page 353 included in defendants' 
summary judgment Exhibits A and B as to which it refused to grant Deputy 
Fannen's motion to strike, but then refused to consider a letter signed by 
plaintiff'and placed by the defendants into Exhibits A and B when it was 
relied upon by plaintiff to demonstrate that the court was both improperly 
weighing evidence and improperly viewing inferences in the light least 
favorable to Deputy Fannen. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the 
gander, the motion to strike properly objected, and the motion for summary 
judgment should not be treated as though it is a motion "made and supported 
as provided in this rule" in assessing what kind of response to it was needed. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - WHISTLE BLOWER STATUTE 
As set forth in Point One, a Notice of Claim was filed on February 4, 
2002, well within one year of June 20,2001, and an action was commenced 
within one year after the ninety day period for responding to the Notice of 
Claim had expired. This constituted full, complete, and strict compliance 
with the Notice of Claim provisions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Under Hall v. State Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34, those Notice of 
Claim provisions supercede the 180-day statute of limitations under the 
Whistle Blower Act. The first claim for relief is timely and is not time barred. 
Further, even if the 180-day statute of limitations applies to the first 
claim for relief [R. 5] pled by Deputy Fannen under the Utah Whistle Blower 
Act, flH^HHIWle undisputed facts show that "on June 20,2001, 
Deputy Fannen was asked to resign and did resign. Deputy Fannen's last day 
of work with Lehi City was June 20,2001. However, his salary and benefits 
continued to September 30,2001." [Defendants' Statement of Facts, R.124] 
The undisputed facts also show that "on February 4,2002, Deputy Fannen 
filed a Notice of Claim with Lehi City." [Defendants' Statement of Facts, 
R.123] The Notice of Claim was filed within 180 days of September 30, 
2001, and it was timely under UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004), since Lehi City 
accepted the February 4,2004, filing of the Notice of a Claim as the 
commencement of the Whistle Blower action when it argued it was untimely 
because it had to be filed within 180 days of June 20,2001. [R. 122] and it is 
now estopped from asserting the action did not commence February 4,2002. 
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In impermissibly drawing inferences in a light most favorable to the 
defendants, the trial court erroneously concluded that the resignation was 
effective June 20,2001, based on "testimony in which plaintiff clearly states, 
under oath, that he left the Lehi Police Department on June 20,2001." [R. 
204] The questions and answers on that page address the time period in 
which Deputy Fannen suffered damages from emotional distress and from 
defamation. It was error to engage in fact-finding and draw the unfavorable 
inference from that testimony that his resignation was effective June 20,2001. 
Even though it was as devoid of proper authentication as the deposition 
pages also included in Exhibits A and B of their moving papers, defendants 
are bound by the June 20,2001, letter. [R. 88] The letf^learJy pro\ftdfrs 
that the resignation was not effective until September 30,2001. It is also 
deemed undisputed that salary and benefits continued until then. [Fact #10] 
"A. attitude. I started losing weight. 
Q. Okay. While you were working at Lehi City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I started getting headaches. And I just started to become reclusive. 
Q. How long - - and then I understand - - is it fair to say that this all - -
your emotional distress - - strike that. I need to ask this in a fair way for you 
to understand. You talked about the day of your resignation, June 20,2001, 
when Ed Collins drove you home and you explained being very upset that 
day. Is that part of your emotional distress claim? Your - - is that one way 
you claim you were damaged emotionally? 
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A. I was emotionally damaged from the time I started getting these 
allegations, for well over a year and a half until the very - - until, until the end 
from the beginning till the very last day I left the Lehi Police Department. 
Q. Which was June 20,2001. 
A. Yes, Ma'am. 
Q. Did your emotional distress" [ R. 93] 
None of mis testimony "clearly" states the resignation was effective 
any earlier than September 30,2001, when all reasonable inferences drawn 
from it are all properly viewed in the light most favorable to Deputy Fannen. 
A "preponderance of evidence" standard, together with the proof that 
is required to establish a Whistle Blower claim under UCA Sec. 67-21-1, et 
seq.,, is defined by state statute and is set forth at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(4): 
UCA Sec. 67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof 
required. (4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this 
section, the employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the employee has suffered an adverse action because the employee, or 
a person acting on his behalf, engaged or intended to engage in an activity 
protected under Sec. 67-21-3. [emphasis added] [Harassment and termination 
were all adverse actions.] [No mention of actual damages is made herein.] 
Defendants have not established as a matter of law mat Deputy Fannen 
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that his resignation 
was effective September 30,2001, when reasonable inferences from the letter 
and testimony are properly viewed in the light most favorable to Deputy 
Fannen as the party opposed to the summary judgment. Further, facts 1-16, 
deemed admitted by rule, scarcely address the facts pled in the complaint in 
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support of the Whistle Blower claim. [R. 5] They do not address or defeat 
allegations in the complaint [R. 15] as to which facts 1 -16 are completely 
silent, nor do they address Fannen's testimony regarding the harms he 
suffered set forth at R. 93 included in defendants' summary judgment 
Exhibits A and B and quoted verbatim on the previous page, which addresses 
actual injury suffered over a lengthy period proximately caused not only by 
the Whistle Blower retaliations over a long period of time, but also by the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation in the Complaint. 
The quoted testimony is hereby incorporated into discussion of those 
other claims herein. The factual allegations in the Complaint stand as part of 
the "pleadings" under URCP 56(c). The pleadings must be considered to the 
fullest extent they have not been controverted by facts 1 -16 or by Exhibits A 
and B in defendants' moving papers. Deputy Fannen has nothing to add and 
stands on the current record as demonstrating his entitlement to a court trial. 
Summary judgment was, thus, not "appropriate" [as required under 
URCP 56(e)] and the factual allegations in the "pleadings" [URCP 56(c)] 
stand to the extent not controverted by facts 1 -16 or Exhibits A and B. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF - EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The severe harassment pled in the record and recapped on page 
29 of this brief constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
"In order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, a plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate that the 
defendant 'intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, 
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(b) where any reasonable person would have known that such 
would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'" 
Bennett v. Jones. Waldo. 2003 UT 9; 70 P.3d 17 [citations omitted]. 
In determining whether the conduct alleged by plaintiff was done with 
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or whether a reasonable person 
would have known that such would result, and whether the actions are of 
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality, the 
court is to look at "the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated." Id. 
The Complaint [R. 15] details a number of particular facts that have not been 
addressed or controverted by any of facts 1-16 deemed undisputed by rule. 
It is reasonable to infer from these well-pleaded facts that defendants 
intended to inflict emotional distress upon Deputy Fannen, or that any 
reasonable person would have known that such would result, and that the 
actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality. Facts 1-16, deemed admitted by rule, scarcely address factual 
allegations pled in support of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. [R. 15-4] They do not address or defeat the allegations pled in the 
Complaint [R. 15] as to which facts 1-16 are silent. Summary judgment was, 
thus, not "appropriate" [as is required under URCP 56(e)] and the factual 
allegations in the "pleadings" [URCP 56(c)] still stand to the extent that they 
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are/were not controverted by Deputy Fannen's admissions as embodied in 
facts 1-16. None of the defendants filed an affidavit denying involvement. 
The facts alleged in the Complaint stand as part of the "pleadings" 
under URCP 56(c) to the fullest extent they have not been addressed and 
controverted by affidavit or otherwise as provided under URCP 56 and to the 
fullest extent that they are not addressed or controverted by facts 1-16 [the 
only facts deemed admitted by rule]. Defendants candidly conceded that 
behavior by members of the Lehi City police department towards Deputy 
Fannen "may have been insulting or even threatening" [R. 120] but argued 
"this does not rise to the level of outrageous under Utah case law." [R. 120] 
Plaintiffs contrary assessment of the matter is that the behavior pled in 
the complaint is, indeed, so outrageous and intolerable that it does "offend 
against generally accepted standards of decency and morality." [The legal 
standard to be applied to the matter as conceded by defendants at R. 120] 
The legal standard is a "generally accepted" standard, presenting a 
question to be answered not by personal individual reactions of thick-skinned 
trial lawyers and appellate judges, but by drawing all reasonable inferences in 
the light most favorable to the victim and men applying the standard. Facts 
alleged and reasonably inferred herein could easily exceed that standard, and 
it is for the trier of fact to find the facts and the court to apply the standard. 
In addressing only a limited number of material questions, Undisputed 
Facts 1-16 establish only that the emotional distress damages ended on the 
date Deputy Fannen resigned on June 20,2001, that he testified that he had a 
good reputation as a police officer and although he believes the defendants 
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attempted to ruin his reputation, they did not succeed in doing so, that on 
December 9,2001, Deputy Fannen was hired as a police officer by the 
Alpine/Highland police department, and that when he apphed for a position 
with the Alpine/Highland police department, Deputy Fannen had to undergo 
both a written and verbal psychological evaluation and never mentioned on 
either that he was suffering any emotional distress. 
This does not establish absence of "severe emotional distress" as a 
matter of law when facts pled and otherwise properly before the court, and all 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, are all viewed in the 
light most favorable to Deputy Fannen. The undisputed fact mat Deputy 
Fannen acknowledges that the emotional distress he claims to have suffered 
as a result of defendants' alleged actions ended on the date he resigned June 
20,2001, mat Deputy Fannen testified that he had a good reputation as a 
police officer and although he believes the defendants attempted to ruin his 
reputation, they did not succeed in doing so, that on December 9,2001, 
Deputy Fannen was hired as a police officer by the Alpine/Highland police 
department, and that when he apphed for a position with the Alpine/Highland 
police department, Deputy Fannen had to undergo bom a written and verbal 
psychological evaluation and never mentioned on either that he was suffering 
any emotional distress, does not establish as a matter of law that he did not 
suffer severe emotional distress, as pled, nor do these facts defeat any other 
element pled in support of this claim. The trial court impermissibly weighed 
evidence and gave little or no weight to evidence in the record [in defendants' 
Exhibits A and B in support of summary judgment] or to the large number of 
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allegations in the Complaint that were not addressed or controverted by 
either the facts 1 -16 deemed admitted by rule or by the evidence in Exhibits 
A and B appended to the defendants' supporting memorandum. 
The trial court's weighing of evidence in an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim is very similar to weighing of evidence in an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim engaged in by Judge Stephen 
Henriod in granting summary judgment in the case of Francisconi v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co.. 2001 UT App 350,36 P.3d 999. The intentional 
infliction of emotional distress facts in that employment termination case 
were similar the intentional infliction of emotional distress facts here: 
"Francisconi experienced extreme anxiety, lack of sleep, and 
an outbreak of hives. The assistant vice-president of Union 
Pacific, Mr. Campbell, telephoned Francisconi several times 
demanding his resignation and that he release Union Pacific 
from liability." Id. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded: 
"The trial court also granted summary judgment dismissing 
Francisconi's tort claims for defamation, fraud, and emotional 
distress. One sworn statement under oath [involving a material 
fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby 
precluding summary judgment. Such sworn statements include 
deposition testimony that is before the trial court on summary 
judgment. Francisconi's deposition testimony alleges certain 
facts material to his defamation, fraud, and emotional distress 
claims. However, as Francisconi correctly argues, the trial court 
improperly weighed evidence to reach its determination that 
material issues of fact surrounding [these issues] were 
undisputed." Id. (internal citations omitted) 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION 
Defendants do not contend mat Deputy Fannen's resignation was 
voluntary. Instead they contend (1) Deputy Fannen was an at-will employee 
who could be discharged without any cause; (2) that while the Utah Whistle 
Blower Act does restrict the right of Lehi City to terminate the employment, 
Deputy Fannen did not timely file; and, (3) no public policy was violated. 
Deputy Fannen's employment was other than at-will. 
None of the summary judgment facts relied upon by the defendants 
establish that the employment was at-will. Instead, defendants rely on the 
Utah at-will presumption. The issue men is whether any of the reasonable 
inferences [to be drawn from the factual allegations in the Complaint and 
other evidence that has not been controverted by the facts 1-16 deemed 
admitted by rule or by the evidence in Exhibits A and B to defendants' 
moving papers] overcome the at-will presumption. Paragraph 37 of the 
Complaint [R. 8] is not controverted by facts 1-16 deemed admitted by rule 
or by the evidence in Exhibits A and B. It details an administrative hearing 
on a charge of insubordination, a report that resulted from mat hearing, an 
appeal to the city manager, and a reversal on appeal by the city manager. 
From this, the reasonable inference can be drawn that Deputy Fannen 
could be terminated only for just cause and that he had administrative due 
process hearing and appeal rights to ensure that a termination was for just 
cause. This is the norm among Utah police officers who routinely enjoy 
hearing and appeal rights and whose employment is not at-will, but protected 
by the kind of employment hearing and appeal rights alleged in paragraph 37. 
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Since it would probably come as quite a surprise to all current Lehi 
City police officers that the city has taken the position in this case mat they 
are at-will employees, defendants do not take that position. Defendants never 
affirmatively contend that any Lehi City police officers in general, or Deputy 
Fannen in particular, are or were ever at-will employees whose employment 
could be terminated without just cause. Instead, they simply discuss the law 
of at-will employment in Utah and then make the very curious statement that 
"Fannen does not claim an express or implied employment agreement existed 
that would modify his at-will employment status." [R. 118] Deputy Fannen 
rejects this statement by defendants. He does, indeed, make that very claim. 
The very essence of any claim for constructive termination is that the 
employment was other than at-will and therefore termination was wrongful. 
The reasonable inferences to be drawn from the Complaint include the 
inference that the employment was other than at-will. The defendants have 
not controverted this in facts 1-16 deemed undisputed or in Exhibits A and 
B. The hearing and appeal alleged in the Complaint give rise to reasonable 
inference that there exists an implied contract that the employment was other 
than at-will when the reasonable inferences are properly drawn in the light 
most favorable to Deputy Fannen. An implied contract such as this one is to 
be afforded equal dignity to an express contract and its terms those which are 
reasonable under the facts from which the implied contract is inferred by 
properly viewing the reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
Deputy Fannen. The Utah at-will presumption has been overcome for now. 
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The termination was restricted by the Utah Whistle Blower act. 
Since the Whistle Blower Act does restrict the right of Lehi City to 
terminate employment, that restriction supports the constructive termination 
claim for relief regardless of whether or not the 180-day statute of limitation 
applies and regardless of whether it was complied with. It no longer applies, 
having been superceded, and the first claim for relief was timely filed. But 
even if it did apply here, expiration of a time limit for a private right of action 
under the statute does not vitiate the violation of the statute by Lehi City and 
does not vitiate the application of the statute to Lehi City in restricting any 
discretion it may have to terminate employees at-will. Therefore, any statutes 
of limitations do not limit application of the state statute itself to Lehi City in 
making an exception to at-will employment for the wrongful termination pled. 
The termination violated public policy. 
The question of whether a termination in violation of the Utah Whistle 
Blower Act is a wrongful discharge in violation of pubhc policy is one of first 
impression. This court should hold that a termination of employment in 
violation of the Utah Whistle Blower Act is also a wrongful discharge in 
violation of pubhc policy. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to identify a 
more substantial, important, and fundamental public policy in our free society 
than rooting out governmental corruption by protecting whistle blowers from 
termination of employment in retaliation for the great courage shown by them. 
There is no need to recognize or protect any "discretion" on the part of 
an employer to retaliate by terminating the employment of a whistle blower. 
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The facts in the cases cited by defendants do not even come close to 
the level of importance as the significant public policy interest in protecting 
whistle blowers with an at-will exception. As this presents an issue of law, 
it is for the Court of Appeals to announce whether or not a termination in 
violation of the Utah Whistle Blower Act is something important enough to 
warrant application of the public policy exception to the at-will presumption. 
While the Utah appellate courts are certainly no friend to employment 
oppression of any kind, including, but not limited to, age-based or sex-based 
employment discrimination, they have refused to extend this public policy 
exception to those areas of such employment oppression either on their merits 
or as having been legislatively pre-empted. But the policy considerations 
involving exposure of public corruption are much more compelling on the 
merits man age-based or sex-based employment discrimination. And there 
is nothing in the Utah Whistle Blower act that either expresses a legislative 
intent to pre-empt the common law in mis area or from which a legislative 
intent to pre-empt the field can be inferred. This case should be used as a 
case of first impression to recognize a governmental whistle-blower public 
policy exception to at-will employment. That is not that much of a leap 
forward, because most public employment in Utah is not at-will. It only 
arises in this case because Lehi City, without coming out and affirmatively 
stating Deputy Fannen was an at-will employees, has defended this case as 
though he was somehow at-will. If the court concludes that defendants have 
not made a sufficient showing to allow the court to conclude, as a matter of 
law, that he was at-will, the public policy exception issue will then be moot. 
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF - DEFAMATION 
Defendants conceded at oral argument [R. 215, p. 12, lines 16 - 21] 
that their apphcation for summary judgment on the defamation claim is based 
exclusively on their position that there was no actual damage. To his credit, 
Deputy Fannen did his best to mitigate the damages from the defamation 
alleged in the Complaint. Deputy Fannen did this by moving on with his life 
and securing other employment as a police officer, then as a deputy sheriff. 
The trial court gave great weight to this while giving no weight to all 
any of the damages from defamation properly in the record and not disputed 
or addressed by the defendants, including, but not limited to, the harm to his 
professional standing as a police officer with a citizen/civilian he brought into 
the police station who saw a picture of Deputy Fannen with a statement that 
Deputy Fannen had "impersonated a police officer and molested chickens." 
[R. 97], the narrowing of future employment opportunities due to statements 
to ambulance and firemen in Lehi not to trust Deputy Fannen [R. 98], and 
damages in having to expend otherwise unneeded time and effort clearing his 
name with prospective future employers who were told by the defendants, 
inter alia, that Deputy Fannen had intentionally rolled his patrol car [R. 95]. 
The trial court's improper weighing of evidence in a defamation, libel, 
and slander claim is very similar to the weighing of evidence in a defamation 
claim engaged in by Judge Stephen Henriod in granting summary judgment in 
the case of Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 2001 UT App 350,36 
P.3d 999. The defamation facts in that employment termination case, which 
was reversed on appeal, are similar to defamation facts that are present here: 
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"Union Pacific officers and agents, including auditors, 
supervisors, and a railroad policeman, confronted Francisconi 
for four hours. Union Pacific accused Francisconi of abusing the 
In Lieu Policy, and presented some grounds and documents 
capable of being construed as evidence of abuse, such as altered 
receipts he had submitted. He was also accused of lying, theft, 
fraud, and abuse of his position. Further, Francisconi was told 
that Union Pacific was considering having him criminally 
prosecuted, which would lead to a search of his relatives' homes. 
Although Francisconi did not believe he was at fault, he asked 
what he could do to keep his job." Id. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the defamation claim 
because Judge Henriod had weighed evidence, as set forth in the holding 
quoted on pages 12-13 above, in which this court also reversed the summary 
judgment as to the emotional distress claim, remanding both to the trial court. 
Just as Mr. Francisconi did not believe he was at fault and asked what 
he could do to keep his job, Deputy Fannen "would not resign" having "done 
no wrong." [R. 96] He has been damaged by libel, slander, and defamation 
that is pleaded in the Complaint and set forth in Exhibit A to the defendants' 
moving papers and it was improper for the trial court to disregard and give no 
weight to those actual damages, as they were not controverted or otherwise 
addressed by facts 1-16 [deemed undisputed by rule] or by other evidence. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF - PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
This claim should be read as applying to the four other claims that are 
incorporated by reference into this claim in paragraph 54 of the Complaint 
[R. 2]. In reversing the summary judgment and remanding this case to the 
trial court, the question of an award of costs against the defendants if plaintiff 
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prevails on the merits, an award of attorney fees against defendants if plaintiff 
prevails on his statutory claim for relief, and an award of punitive damages 
against defendants other than Lehi City should also all be remanded for trial. 
EXHIBITS "A" AND "B" SUPPORT THE CLAIMS PLED 
The motion to strike correctly stated mat defendants' papers contained 
evidence in support of Deputy Fannen's claims and that the trial court was not 
authorized to weigh evidence. Under the proper standard of review, set forth 
in Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. the Court of Appeals has held: 
"One sworn statement under oath [involving a material 
fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, 
thereby precluding summary judgment. Such sworn 
statements include deposition testimony that is before the 
trial court on summary judgment. Id. [emphasis added] 
The Court of Appeals further explained: 
"We refuse to take [these issues] from the jury if there is 
any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the 
truth of Francisconi's claims. Accordingly, the district court 
improperly granted summary judgment dismissing these 
claims." Id. [citations omitted] [emphasis added] 
"We do not necessarily say that Francisconi's claims have 
merit. They may not. However, in reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Viewing the facts in this manner, we cannot 
affirm summary judgment." itf. n.4 [citations omitted] 
Since the lower court overruled Deputy Fannen's objections to Exhibits 
A and B, this court should apply the contents of Exhibits A and B consistently 
with Francisconi. The trial court ignored the deficiencies in defendants' filing 
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to allow the court to embrace the contents of those exhibits. [Their moving 
papers never alleged their statement of facts was undisputed, their moving 
papers never cited a rule upon which their summary judgment motion was 
based, their moving papers never alleged mat there was no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.] 
Since the trial court accepted Exhibits A and B, this court should now 
accept all portions thereof that constitute "deposition testimony that is before 
the trial court on summary judgment" that support Deputy Fannen's claims. 
Even though facts 1-16 [deemed undisputed by rule] do not settle the 
question, and even though Deputy Fannen pointed-out in his motion to strike 
that Exhibits A and B required the court improperly to weigh the evidence 
therein, the court treated the absence of further facts or evidence from Deputy 
Fannen as somehow triggering automatic entitlement to summary judgment. 
The trial court accepted defendants' argument that Deputy Fannen's 
memorandum "should set out the facts they contest and say why, and should 
support that controversion with affidavits, with other portions of Mr. Fannen's 
deposition." [R. 215, p. 5., lines 20-22] To the contrary, the absence of any 
such "controversion" simply means that the numbered facts are deemed 
admitted by rule, not that summary judgment is automatic. URCP 56(e) 
provides that summary judgment should be entered only if appropriate. 
Since facts 1 -16 do not settle the question, summary judgment cannot 
appropriately be based on those facts even though they are all undisputed. 
It was also not necessary to supplement the record with additional 
deposition pages or with additional affidavits, as argued by defendants and 
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embraced by the trial court, because a motion to strike those deposition pages 
was timely filed, and, prior to any ruling by the court on that motion to strike, 
the undersigned counsel relied on Exhibits A and B as supporting all of the 
claims for relief pleaded in the Complaint. That reliance upon Exhibits A 
and B was made at the first and only motion hearing [R. 215, pp. 13 - 34] 
and the undersigned counsel quoted liberally from the deposition pages that 
were relied upon by defendants in their application for summary judgment. 
In addressing what the court characterized as these "well-articulated 
objections during oral argument" by the undersigned counsel [R. 162], the 
trial court stated that it "refuses to consider these objections because Plaintiff 
refused to reduce them to Pleadings as demanded by the Rule." [R. 163] This 
was error in law by the trial court. The only "Pleadings" in this case are the 
Complaint and the Answer. No rule allows, let alone demands, "Pleadings" 
to be filed in in opposition to a summary judgment motion. The motion and 
memorandum to strike were timely. They duly opposed summary judgment 
because it would require the court to engage in impermissible fact-finding and 
to apply the wrong legal standard. Further, "the Rule" [formerly CJA 4-501, 
now URCP 7] provides that the facts listed by a movant are deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment, not mat summary judgment shall enter. 
The summary judgment record includes undisputed facts 1-16, the 
defendants' Exhibits A and B, and the Complaint to the fullest extent its facts 
are not controverted by undisputed facts 1-16 or by deposition testimony in 
Exhibits A and B. Deputy Fannen has nothing more to add. Deputy Fannen 
stands on this record as establishing a right to proceed to a trial on the merits. 
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Movants are the masters of their motion and are solely responsible for 
the undisputed facts they choose to have deemed admitted by rule. It is not 
appropriate to grant a summary judgment when those facts do not settle the 
question and require the court to engage in impermissible fact-finding and to 
apply the wrong legal standard in drawing factual inferences. For example, 
defendants concede that as to the defamation claim, their summary judgment 
motion is based solely on a defense of no actual damages. [R. 215, p. 12, 
lines 16-21] All they had to do was list as an undisputed fact: "At no time 
did Fannen suffer any actual damages from any alleged defamation of him by 
any defendant." Instead of listing that ultimate fact, they listed facts 1-16, 
facts that incompletely address damages, do not settle the question, and that 
require the court to engage in impermissible fact-finding and apply the wrong 
legal standard in drawing factual inferences. It is not necessary for Deputy 
Fannen to show defendants ruined his reputation. Passage of time and smart 
mitigation can heal emotional distress and cure defamations even as vile as 
the ones here. [An astounding array including criminal conduct, intentionally 
rolling a police car, molesting chickens, sexism, racism, Ku Klux Klanism, the 
cruel defamation of Deputy Fannen's manhood and/or his sound judgment by 
imputing unchastity to his spouse, and all the other matters in the Complaint.] 
Since intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation are not 
mutually exclusive, all of this misconduct encompasses both of these torts. A 
victim can recover all of his or her damages even if a reputation is not ruined. 
It is very hard to ruin one's reputation in America. Martha Stewart's 
earning power has gone up. Disgraced convicted elected officials can often 
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be re-elected solely on the basis of name-recognition. Therefore, one falsely 
defamed always has hope of rehabilitation of reputation through mitigation 
and passage of time. That does not allow the persons who committed the tort 
of defamation to escape all liability for damages until rehabilitation occurs. 
The defendants have not demonstrated such an absence of damages as 
a matter of law in the undisputed facts 1-16 they chose to present herein as to 
defamation. Their showing is similarly incomplete as to all the other claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Deputy Fannen is willing to stand or fall based on the testimony he 
gave at his deposition as embodied in Exhibits A and B and as embodied in 
facts 1 -16 [which are deemed undisputed by rule], and on his Complaint. He 
does ask that all parts of his Complaint that are not in conflict with Exhibits A 
and B or with facts 1-16, and that all parts of Exhibit A and B that are not in 
conflict with facts 1-16, now be viewed in the light most favorable to him and 
that all inferences from all of the foregoing be reasonably drawn in his favor. 
He asks the court to rule that his filing of his Complaint was timely 
and that under the case that he cited in his Complaint, Hall v. Department of 
Corrections, 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958, the Notice of Claim time limits apply. 
Summary judgment should jtfe reversed and the case remanded. 
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF JAMJARt, 2005. 
PlainuWAppellant 
Deputy Charles Douglas Fannen 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES DOUGLAS FANNEN, 
Plaintiff, 
) COMPLAINT 
(Whistle Blower Statute) 
) (UCA 67-21-1) 
Vs. 
OF LEHI, a political subdivision 
Of the State of Utah and its Police 
Department; ED COLLINS, City 
Manager; Karl Zimmerman, Chief of Police; 
Lt Chad Smith; Sgt. Doug Larsen; ) 
Sgt. Harold Terry; Sgt. Jeff Swenson; and 
Sgt. James Munson, ) 
) Case No. 0 2 ^ 0 7 ^ 0 
Judge: ^OMfodt-]^ 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW Charles Douglas Fannen, through Counsel, and Complains of the 
Defendants who allowed and participated in adverse/discriminatory actions taken against 
him and his family over a period of 33 months that resulted in his constructive 
termination of his employment because he communicated in good faith a suspected 
violation of a law adopted under the law of this state ( 67-21-3): 
JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Charles Douglas Fannen is a resident of Utah County and a former 
police officer employed by the City of Lehi's Police Department. 
2. Defendant Ed Collins is a resident of Utah County and employed by the City 
of Lehi as its City Manager. 
3. Defendant Karl Zimmerman is a resident of Utah County and employed by the 
City of Lehi as the Chief of Police. 
4. Defendant Chad Smith is a resident of Utah County and employed by the City 
of Lehi as a Lieutenant in the Police Department. 
5. Defendant Doug Larsen is a resident of Utah County and employed by the City 
of Lehi as a Sergeant in the Police Departmetit. 
6. Defendant Harold Terry is a resident of Utah County and employed by the City 
of Lehi as a Sergeant in the Police Department. 
7. Defendant Jeff Swenson is a resident of Utah County and employed by the 
City of Lehi as a Sergeant in the Police Department. 
8. James Munson is a resident of Utah County and employed by the City of Lehi 
as a Sergeant in the Police Department. 
9. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Fourth District Count as stated in U.C.A. 
Section 78-3-4, U.C.A. Section 67-21-4(2) and (3), and the Constitution of Utah, Article 
VIII, Section 5. Plaintiff served on the City Manager for the City of Lehi, Utah and 
Mayor Ken Greenwood of the City of Lehi, Utah via Certified Mail Return Receipt 
Requested, on February 4, 2002, a NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY OF 
LEHI, UTAH, pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court Ruling in the case of HALL V. 
STATE DEP'T OF CORR., 2001 UT 34, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 2001). Therein, 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the Governmental Immunity Act ( U.C.A. Section 63-
30-1) does not protect the state and its political subdivisions from lawsuits arising under 
the Whistleblower Act (U.C.A. Section 67-21-3) but the notice of claim under the Act 
must be complied with. Defendant's had ninety days to either accept or deny the 
Plaintiffs claim. Ninety days has passed and the Defendant's have not accepted, denied 
or responded in any way to Plaintiffs Notice of Claim. 
VENUE 
10. Venue is proper in Utah County. All causes of actions arose in Utah County 
and Defendant resides in Utah County thereby complying with the requirements of 
U.C.A. Section 78-13-7. 
FACTS 
11. The facts alleged in this Complaint are inclusive but are not limited only to 
those stated herein. Some of Plaintiff s peers who are aware of all the adverse actions 
taken against the Plaintiff and his family are reluctant to come forward and give evidence 
because they fear retaliation by the Defendants. Should they decide to come forward and 
give evidence then their facts are to be incorporated herein by reference and be made a 
part of this Complaint against the Defendants. 
12. Sometime during January or February, 1998, Plaintiff anonymously contacted 
a Workman's Compensation Fund Fraud Investigator and provided information that 
Defendant Sergeant James Munson wrecked his motorcycle in Idaho injuring his back. 
Defendant Munson then returned to work and filed a Workman's Compensation Claim 
for a back injury caused by lifting a box of evidence supplies from the trunk of his car. 
13. Plaintiff notified the Workman's Compensation Fund Fraud Investigator 
because he thought something was being covered up after Officer Wade Butterfield spoke 
with Defendant Chief of Police Karl Zimmerman about his suspicions of Defendant 
Munson's Workman's Compensation Claim. Officer Wade Butterfield in a subsequent 
conversation with Plaintiff reported that Defendant Zimmerman told him he needed to 
worry about his own problems. Based upon that information there might be a cover up, 
Plaintiff made anonymously the telephone call to the Fraud Investigator. 
14. The Fraud Investigator interviewed Officer Wade Butterfield, Officer Darren 
Paul, Defendant Sergeant James Munson, Defendant Chief Karl Zimmerman, and 
Defendant Lieutenant Chad Smith. 
15. Defendant Smith stated if he ever found out who reported the incident, he 
was going to sue that person for slander. Defendant Munson became very vocal about his 
anger toward the person who reported the incident. At a subsequent Department meeting 
where this incident was discussed a verbal argument broke out between Defendant 
Lieutenant Chad Smith and Officer Wade Butterfield. Defendant Smith became so angry 
that he smashed a coke can against a conference table. 
16. Subsequently, Plaintiff told Defendant Chief Karl Zimmerman he was the one 
who reported the incident to the Fraud Investigator. Defendant Zimmerman assured 
Plaintiff there would be no retaliation against him. However, from that point on 
Plaintiff's presence sense impression could sense anger from Defendant Zimmerman, 
Defendant Smith, and Defendant Munson every time he was around them. 
The discriminatory adverse actions started on or about April 1998. 
18. In April 1998, Plaintiff found in his Department message box a computer 
printout "Wanted Poster" with Plaintiffs name on it. The "Wanted Poster" read that 
Plaintiff was wanted for molesting chickens (meaning Plaintiff was a chicken fucker) and 
impersonating a police officer. 
19. Approximately one month later Plaintiff found another paper in his 
Department message box. It was a Klu Klux Klan Application with his name as applicant. 
20. Two weeks later Plaintiff found a nametag on his Department message box 
which read "Grand Wizard Fannen." 
21. During July 1998, Plaintiff found a cartoon in his Department message box 
depicting him as a racist police officer. 
22. Several months later, Plaintiffs wife was called a 'Svhore" when Plaintiff 
found a note in his Department message box reading, 'Tor a good time call Jennifer 
Fannen." Plaintiff contacted his immediate supervisor, Defendant Sergeant Doug Larsen, 
and advised him of the on-going problem and wanted it stopped. Particularly, notes 
calling Plaintiffs wife a whore. Defendant Larsen made no comment and did not take the 
on-going problem seriously. 
23. Plaintiff then went to Defendant Chief Karl Zimmerman with the same 
request. Defendant Chief Zimmerman made no investigation into the ongoing problem. 
Later Defendant Zimmerman lied when he claimed he asked Plaintiff for copies of all 
materials placed in his Department message box and Plaintiff refused to turn over copies 
of the materials. 
24. Plaintiff went on vacation with his family. When he returned, Plaintiff found 
a note in his Department message box that read, "Leave.. .Leave.. .Leave." Plaintiff 
contacted Defendant Zimmerman and complained that by not stopping the harassment or 
doing an investigation to determine whom was/is responsible, Defendant Zimmerman 
had allowed a hostile workplace environment to develop against the Plaintiff. 
25. Defendant Zimmerman then took copies of all material placed in Plaintiff's 
Department message box. At the next Department meeting Defendant Zimmerman only 
stated what would happen to the person(s) if the problem persisted and then said that 
Plaintiff would be the first person to get a lie detector test. 
26. Plaintiff then went to Defendant Terry and told him Defendant Zimmerman 
had again made a false statement in the Department meeting. Plaintiff told Defendant 
Terry he was offended that he as a victim would be treated as the first suspect to be 
questioned in front of the Department. Defendant Zimmerman was not honest in his 
statement and was trying to remove the personal liability for failing to take care of the 
problem properly. Defendant Terry told Plaintiff his comments were borderline 
insubordination. 
27. Defendant Terry told Plaintiff that he was talking about some of his best 
fiiends and was also talking about the leaders of the Department. Should he ever repeat 
those statements to anyone, Plaintiff would be charged with insubordination. 
28. Defendant Zimmerman retaliated by refusing to pay Plaintiff for his time 
spent on the S. W.A.T. training until he was reminded of the Fair Labor and Standards 
Act. Defendant Zimmerman said he would take care of it but never paid Plaintiff for all 
his time even though the time was accounted for. 
29. When Plaintiff was about to go on vacation he noticed his statement was 
short on vacation hours and he told Defendant Terry the City had made a mistake. 
Defendant Terry told Plaintiff to take negative sick hours to cover the vacation and then 
make the appropriate changes when he returned from his vacation. 
30. When Plaintiff returned home from vacation he had a voice mail that said 
when Defendant Terry brought up the subject of sick leave it was stated that the abuse of 
sick leave is a terminable offense and sick time had to be approved by a supervisor or 
Defendant Chief Zimmerman. When Plaintiff received his paycheck he was not paid for 
the sick leave he used to cover his vacation. 
31. When Plaintiff asked Defendant Chief Zimmerman about not being paid for 
the sick leave, Defendant Zimmerman told Plaintiff he did not have the approval to do 
this, Plaintiff told Defendant Zimmerman he had the approval of Defendant Terry. 
Defendant Zimmerman then said he would not be paid, end of discussion. Plaintiff then 
went to Defendant Terry and told him he was the one that gave the approval to use the 
sick leave and Plaintiff felt like he was being set up. 
32. Plaintiff was given a written warning for going home early from work. A 
practice that other officers and detectives did but were never suffered reprimands. 
33. Plaintiff reported to Defendant Terry the unsafe practices (officer safety) of 
Officer Burch and his errors in judgment. Defendant Terry told Plaintiff to document his 
observations on his fellow officer. After Plaintiff did this Defendant Terry called Plaintiff 
into his office and told him he could be written up for causing problems with employees. 
34. Plaintiff was called to a domestic disturbance and arrested a female. When 
Plaintiff tried to execute the arrest the female started kicking and punching Plaintiffs 
nose. Officer Burch was present and failed to assist the Plaintiff. After booking the 
female into jail, Plaintiff called Defendant Terry and notified him of the situation. 
Plaintiff asked Defendant Terry how many other officer's safety would be risked before 
Officer Burch would be dealt with appropriately. 
35. Defendant Terry told Plaintiff they were not going to talk about Officer 
Burch but he was going to notify Defendant Zimmerman and Defendant Smith and they 
would go to the jail and do a use offeree investigation on Plaintiffs arrest of the female 
at the domestic disturbance. 
36. Plaintiff was dispatched to a call of possible juveniles inside an abandoned 
hospital building. Defendant's Terry and Swenson also responded to the call and later 
reprimanded Plaintiff for leaving his lights on in response to a prowler call. Plaintiff told 
Defendant's Terry and Swenson it was not a prowler inside call but a juveniles playing 
inside call. Leaving the lights on was not against policy. However, this scenario was later 
used as one of the reasons the department was going to fire Plaintiff. 
37. During December of 2000, Plaintiff, was summoned to an administrative 
hearing on the charge of insubordination by Defendant Chief Zimmerman. Defendant 
Zimmerman forbid Plaintiff to go to "Street Survival Training" in Las Vegas. Plaintiff 
filed a complaint with the City Manager, Defendant Collins, who found that Defendant 
Terry had lied on his report that brought the charges on insubordination. Defendant Terry 
was never reprimanded or disciplined for lying on his report. 
38. Defendant Zimmerman forbid Plaintiff to contact the City Manager without 
going through him first even though the City Manager had an open door policy for 
anyone. 
39. Plaintiff has been falsely accused by the Defendants of trying to roll his car; 
hitting suspects with his baton in improper strike zones; pulling a gun on truck drivers on 
1-70; calling a 150 pound female a bullet stopper; failing to file charges; and missing 
Court. The Department had been preaching in Department Meetings that it was a Class 
"C" Misdemeanor to miss Court and it would have to be reported to P.O.S.T. All these 
charges were unfounded and brought by the Defendants to get Plaintiff fired because he 
reported a suspected violation of the law. 
40. On the charge of pulling a gun on a truck driver on 1-70 incident, Plaintiff 
was placed on administrative leave; relieved of his gun, badge, all forms of police ID, and 
his police car. During the investigation Plaintiff was not allowed to make a statement or 
have witnesses give statements because he was told their statements would be hearsay. 
However, the truck driver's statements were accepted at face value. At the beginning of 
the investigation, Defendant Terry told Officer Mike Roberts of the Pleasant Grove 
Police Department they (Defendants) were investigating Plaintiff and he was as good as 
fired. 
41. After two weeks Defendant City Manager, Ed Collins called and set up a 
meeting with Plaintiff and Defendant Chief Zimmerman concerning the investigation. At 
this meeting Defendant Zimmerman spoke only of the accusations in paragraphs 39 and 
40 above. Defendant Zimmerman spoke about the truck driving incident only that the 
truck drivers saw a gun on the dash of Plaintiff s car. Plaintiff was told that the 
Department wanted his resignation. Defendant Collins stated he had spoken with a very 
reputable hostile work environment attorney and that Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff 
refused to sign and Defendant Collins said he would not accept Plaintiffs refusal to 
resign and Plaintiff needed to think about it. 
42. Defendant Collins told Plaintiff the Department did not want to work with 
him anymore. Plaintiff stated he did not want to resign because he did nothing wrong. 
43. Defendant Collins stated that if Plaintiff did not resign he would have to do 
the investigation and would rather not because of laziness on his part. At that point 
Plaintiff felt there had been a complete severance of any relationship between him, the 
police department, and the City of Lehi, Utah because he had reported an abuse of the 
Workman's Compensation Act involving serious misconduct and in all likelihood was a 
felony. He no longer had a base of support from anyone and had no choice but to resign. 
Plaintiff agreed to resign. Defendant Collins typed up the resignation and rode home with 
Plaintiff. 
44. Upon arriving at Plaintiffs home Defendant Collins told Plaintiffs wife, 
Jennifer, that Plaintiff had resigned but he had done no wrong, (emphasis added). Jennifer 
asked Plaintiff if he had done no wrong why was he allowing this to happen. Defendant 
Collins told Jennifer that if Plaintiff had not resigned then it would be something else 
next week and they would drag Plaintiffs name through the mud. Defendant Collins 
fiirther stated he now knew the Police Department Administration had lied to him. 
Jennifer then asked, if that is the case why isn't the Administration being punished, 
especially when the report was falsified. Defendant Collins said they would get what was 
coming to them in the next life. That you reap what you sow and it was water under the 
bridge. Defendant Collins fiirther stated it was the best thing foi everybody and to just 
look at it as a paid, three month, vacation. Defendant Collins then left. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Adverse Action - Discrimination) 
45. Plaintiff incorporates herein all the facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 44 
by reference as allegations for this cause of action. 
46. Prior to Plaintiff communicating in good faith a suspected violation of a law 
he had established a professional career as a police officer with the City of Lehi, Utah 
and was known as a good cop. However, immediately after Defendants became aware 
that Plaintiff was the one who reported the suspected violation of the law, they began a 
pattern of adverse/discriminatory actions over a period of 33 months, e.g. threat of a law 
suit for slander; Defendants attitude changed toward him; disparate treatment; uneven 
enforcement of rules; hostile work environment; false reports filed against him; accused 
of lying; threatened with a polygraph test; threats of disciplinary actions; unpaid wages; 
given a written warning; denied schooling and training; forbidden to speak with the City 
Manager; accused of destroying Department property; accused of brandishing a weapon; 
defamatory notes placed in his Department message box; and his wife was accused of 
being a whore. All the above were intentional and retaliatory in nature causing Plaintiff 
and his family to be subject to ridicule, embarrassment, and humiliation. All these 
adverse/discriminatory actions are in violation of U.C.A. Section 67-21-3(l)(a). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court will grant him the relief he more 
specifically prays for in his PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
47. Plaintiff incorporates herein all the facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 46 
by reference as allegations for this cause of action. 
48. It was very evident in Plaintiffs mind that the Defendants 
adverse/discriminatory actions were designed to ruin his chosen professional career as a 
police officer with the City of Lehi Police Department and any other police department in 
the State of Utah. The leaked rumors and innuendos to other police officers and police 
departments. The Defendants failure to investigate the suspected violation of the 
Workman's Compensation Act; the lack of support and animosity against him caused 
Plaintiff extrenle emotional distress and anguish. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court will grant him the relief more 
specifically prayed for in his PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Termination) 
49. Plaintiff incorporated herein all the facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 
48 by reference as allegations for this cause of action. 
50. The adverse/discriminatory actions by the Defendants caused a complete 
severance of the employer and employee relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants 
causing a constructive termination. The Defendants violated a duty imposed by law under 
the Whistleblower Act (U.C.A. Section 67-21-1 et. sec), known as the Utah Protection of 
Public Employees Act. U.C.A. Section 67-21-4 sets a duty imposed by law independent 
of any employee contract. All the Defendants have an obligation to refrain from acts that 
cause a constructive termination. Their liability is based on a violation of a legal duty 
independently imposed as a result of what the Defendants undertook to do with relation 
to Plaintiffs interest of performing a public obligation. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court will grant him the relief more 
specifically prayed for in Plaintiffs PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Defamation, Libel, and Slander) 
51. Plaintiff incorporates herein all the facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 50 
by reference as allegations for this cause of action. 
52. All of Defendants' actions were willful and malicious. The Defendants held 
Plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and injured him in his professional career as a 
law enforcement officer with the Lehi City Police Department. Defendants also tried to 
ruin his professional career with other police departments by leaks and innuendos. 
53. Defendants' written publication to Plaintiff (known to the rest of the 
Department's personnel) "For a good time call Jennifer Fannen," was intended to impugn 
Plaintiffs wife's character as a malicious and willful retaliatory action and impugn the 
professional capability of the Plaintiff. This false and defamatory statement was an 
unprivileged negligent communication to other members of the Department. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court will grant him the relief more 
specifically prayed for in Plaintiffs PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Attorney Fees and Costs) 
54. Plaintiff incorporates herein all the facts contained in paragraphs 1 through 53 
by reference as allegations for this cause of action. 
55. Plaintiff has had to hire the services of an attorney to prosecute this action 
in his behalf. In doing so has had to pay attorney fees and costs to prosecute this action. If 
Plaintiff prevails in this litigation U.C.A. Section 67-21-5(2) allows the Court to award 
Plaintiff the cost of litigation, reasonable attorney fees and witness fees. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court will grant him the relief more 
specifically prayed for in his PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays and ^sks for: 
1. For the First Cause of Action that Plaintiff be given a Judgment in his favor 
and against the Defendants for general damages in the sum of $750,000.00; Punitive 
damages pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-18-1 in the sum of $750,000.00. 
2. For the Second Cause of Action that Plaintiff be given a Judgment in his favor 
and against the Defendants for general damages in the sum of $750,000,00; Punitive 
damages pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-18-1 in the sum of $750,000.00. 
3. For the Third Cause of Action that Plaintiff be given a Judgment in his favor 
and against the Defendants for general damages in the sum of $750,000.00; Punitive 
damages pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-18-1 in the sum of $750,000.00. 
4. For the Fourth Cause of Action that Plaintiff be given a Judgment in his favor 
and against the Defendants for general damages in the sum of $750,000.00; Punitive 
damages pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-18-1 in the sum of $750,000.00. 
5. For the Fifth Cause of Action that Plaintiff be given a Judgment in his favor 
and against the Defendants for costs of litigation to be proven at Court; For costs of 
witness fees to be proven at Court; dnd Attorney fees in a sum of no less than $7,000.00 
and more if proven in Court. 
6. For such other and farther relief that the Court may deem just in the premise. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2002. 
ARON STANTON P.C 
Attorney fppW^fitf ~~ v 
Plaintiffs Address: 
944 North 790 East 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
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A. I came out here to reserve for Lehi 
Police Department. 
Q. And we're obviously going to go over 
that job in detail. But if you can just, for 
now, give me the dates of employment, as you 
recall them. 
A. I started reserving in July of '97. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And went to work full-time April 27, 
1998 . 
Q. Through--
A. Excuse me. 
Q. Through what date? 
A. Through September 30 of 2001. 
Q. Okay. After you left Lehi City, where 
did you go next? 
A. Alpine/Highland Police Department. 
Q. And what were those dates? 
A. December 9, 2001 to September of 2002. 
Q. So, approximately, two--there was two 
months between Lehi Police Department and 
Alpine/Highland Police Department. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do in the interim? 
A. Completed their psychological tests and 
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" R e f r e s h . " 
MS. BASSETT: I'm sorry. I need to say 
refresh your recollection. 
MR. SKOLNICK: That's okay. All right. 
Let's forge ahead. 
MS. BASSETT: We're ready to go on. 
BY MS. BASSETT: 
Q. Okay. Some time in the past we started 
talking about paragraph 11 of your complaint. I 
think we're going to finally move on to paragraph 
12. I would like you to take a minute and read 
paragraphs 12 through 16 of your deposition—or 
excuse me--of the complaints you filed in this 
case. Just--you are welcome to do so silently. 
I just want you to review those quickly. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you reviewed those? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you'll look with me at paragraph 12. 
Regarding an anonymous report you made to the 
Workers' Compensation Fund, I want you to first 
confirm that that report regarded Sergeant James 
Munson. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Explain for me what information 
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you h a d t o b a s e s u c h a r e p o r t o n . 
A. I was i n my s e r g e a n t — S e r g e a n t Doug 
L a r s e n ' s o f f i c e . 
Q. O k a y . 
A. At Lehi Police Department. 
Q. Approximately when? 
A. Approximately sometime around December 
or January. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Of 1998. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Sergeant Larsen and Officer Wade 
Butterfield were talking about this situation and 
said, It sure is odd. I don't remember exactly 
who said it, but said, It sure is odd that a 
detective can go up to Idaho, wreck his 
motorcycle, and have the administration saying 
that we need to pray for him and everybody needs 
to make sure he fs--just give him support. But 
then he comes back and works for 15 minutes. And 
all of a sudden throws his back out. And the 
city pays the bill on it. 
Q. Let me stop you right there. Were you 
a party on this conversation? 
A. I overheard this conversation, yes. 
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speak to me. Opens the door and slams the door 
on his way out. I knew at that point that things 
were going to change. I could sense it from that 
point on. 
Q. And this was the meeting just following 
the--
A. Yes , Ma'am. 
Q. --department meeting? Okay. The very 
last sentence of paragraph 16 of your complaint 
says, "the discriminatory adverse actions started 
on or about April 1998." And--
A. That's--
Q. Go ahead. 
A. I started April of 1998. That is not 
a--that is a date I have went back. And that is 
not a valid date. 
Q. Okay. That's what I was going to ask 
you. I was confused why that statement when that 
was your start date. 
A. Yes , Ma' am. 
Q. So why don't you explain that to me? 
A. I started April 27, 1998. I know that, 
because that's the day my oldest boy was born on. 
Q. Okay. 
A. After working there f o r — I would guess 
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four to five months is when I started just 
getting these letters. I didn't know if it was a 
joke or not. But I do know that we bring 
citizens, civilians, whatever you want to call 
them, into the police department. 
I even had one in there that night that 
I had a picture hanging up about me being — it had 
my--they had my hair skimmed off my head on the 
computer. Had a picture of me and stating that I 
impersonated a police officer, I molest chickens. 
At that point, I started keeping this 
stuff, because I did not know who was doing it. 
I did not know if it was out of anger, out of a 
joke. But I did not see anybody else really 
getting posters pinned up about them, letters 
about their wives. I saw nobody else, in an 
almost 20-man department at that time, that ever 
had that had happen to them. 
So I was keeping that. I was trying to 
keep it quiet. As far at that point, I felt, 
Well, I want to get along. I want to work with 
everybody. I was just holding it. And that's 
when the stuff started. It just kept piling and 
piling and piling and piling. 
Q. Okay. And we'll go into detail about 
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tickets, through signatures on reports, and find 
out who did this. I said, The person that did 
this did not even spell my name right. My last 
name is spelled F-A-N-N-E-N. This is spelled A-N 
Q. Okay. 
A. I said, I'm sure at some point during 
the time I had started someone has spelled my 
name A-N until they realized it was E-N. I said, 
I want an investigation done with this. And I 
want to know who's doing it. And I want it 
stopped. And I told him, I want to be notified 
when it is—when you find out who has done it. 
And at no point did he ask me to--did 
he even offer to take my items, photocopy or the 
originals, to show the person or persons doing it. 
At no point did he state he would do an 
investigation to get it stopped. And I told him, 
If I have to this, I will. He said, Well then 
I'll see what I can do. Something to that 
effect. 
I said, Well, in the next department 
meeting it had better be brought up. I said, I'm 
not going to be there, but it had better be 
brought up. I have enough friends in the police 
department, I'll know if it's brought up or not. 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-98S-2180 Toll Eree; 877-441-2180 Fax: 801-98S-2181 
Deposition of Douglas Fannen (Vol. 1) 3/21/03 118 
And it is brought up just for a few 
seconds saying something to the effect, Guys, this 
is bathroom smut, you've brought his wife into it, 
it's got to stop. That's how it was taken care 
of at that point . 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. Through officers that were at that 
meeting. 
Q. Who? 
A. Through Joe Adams, Kenny Rose. Through 
talking to Chief Zimmerman himself. I went to 
him, and I told him, Chief, I don't feel that 10, 
15 seconds of saying a statement is taking care 
of this problem. I said, This problem has been 
going on now for months, and it's not going to be 
stopped by a 10 second, 15 second conversation. 
You know, Bryan Ricks is the one that 
told me that Chief said that. Yeah, he said it, 
but it wasn't very long. I don't know what, you 
know. And I said, Well, that's fine. At that 
point is when I started — well, I had contacted an 
attorney, because I felt this was not going to 
stop. That this harassment started at the time I 
reported to the State. 
I was advised by an attorney, You need 
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he had brought it up in a department meeting to 
correct the problem. And I advised him that that 
was only, that was months after I had went to him 
only t o — b e c a u s e I had told him that I was 
seeking an attorney. 
And that I told him I felt the only 
reason he was now trying to go back after a year 
plus of this was just to — because I think they 
knew they had done wrong. And I felt--I told 
Chief Zimmerman, I felt you are now trying to 
backtrack and cover your tracks for not taking 
care of the problem originally. 
Q. Now is this a second meeting you are 
talking a b o u t — 
A. 11 i s after--
Q. --where it was brought up again? 
A. It is after him and I wrote a letter 
back to each other concerning this. I then 
talked to him shortly, a day or two after this 
letter. 
Q. Okay. I am going to have you look at 
another exhibit. But first, let me just ask you 
your memory of the meeting. Were you at the 
meeting, the follow up "meeting after the 
"Leave. . .Leave. . .Leave"? 
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A. Yes, I was. 
Q. The department meeting? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. What was said there with regard to this 
incident? The incident of this letter or any 
other notes being left in your mailbox. 
A. Chief Zimmerman then, after I had told 
him about this, sometime, either shortly before or 
after, he took photocopies of this finally. 
Q. Okay. 
A. In the department meeting he had them 
in his hand. And stated that I had came to him--
something to this effect. That I had came to him 
with a problem, someone was putting stuff in my 
box. And that it had better quit. They're going 
to do an investigation on it, starting with a lie 
detector test and that would start with me. And 
that he had wanted to bring this forward before, 
but I would not let him. Which is totally 
untrue. 
And then I--after the department 
meeting, I told him, I think it's very insulting 
that me being the victim in this, being the first 
person to take a lie detector test. I told him, 
I do not feel, I said, I feel everyone should 
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take one, from the administrator down to the last 
officer hired. 
Q. And did he not agree to take one 
himself? 
A. After — in front of the whole 
department, he says that I will be the first 
person to take one, as if I am doing this to 
myself. That's what officers got the — that was 
the general consensus among the officers. He was 
trying to pawn this back. That I was doing this 
myself. 
Q. Did he make any such statement? 
A. To me he has. Not during that 
department meeting. 
Q. When? 
A. At some point during a conversation. I 
do not know the exact month. When he — a t some 
point before, he told me that, again, he said, 
You'll be the first person we give a lie detector 
test to. 
Q. And did — 
A. And I said — 
Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry. 
A. I told him, I said, Well, let me tell 
you something. If this keeps going on, I will 
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knew I r e p o r t e d t h e m t o t h e S t a t e i n s u r a n c e 
i n v e s t i g a t o r . 
Q. O k a y . Now w e ' l l go p a r a g r a p h 4 0 . 
you w i l l r e a d t h a t f o r me, p l e a s e . 
A . O k a y . 
Q. Explain to me the basis of your 
allegations in paragraph 40. 
If 
I'm coming back from vacation. 
Okay. First a time frame, as always, 
May, approximately, of 2001. 
Okay . 
I'm coming back on 1-70 through 
About 30 miles outside of Limon, 
A. 
Q. 
thanks. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Colorado 
Colorado. 
Q. Okay. 
A. We get behind two semi-trucks. And 
there's one behind us still. I try to go around 
one in the fast lane. The one in front slides 
over. The one that--the re ' s one now still to my 
right on the passenger side. There's one behind 
that — he pulls in behind us, and they slow down 
very rapidly to where they can close in on us. 
We drove like that for probably--we11, 
this happened about 50 miles out of Limon, 
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Colorado. We drove like had that for probably 15 
miles. The one on the side would swerve in to 
us. My wife was starting to--she thought they 
were going to lose control and hurt the kids. My 
kids were starting to scream, because my wife is 
getting upset and afraid. 
This went on and on. The guy in front 
would put his brakes on, and the guy in back — and 
I'm in a Nissan Ultima. And I literally--I mean, 
like I say, I have extensive background in 
driving. I honestly thought something was going 
to happen. 
I take my wallet badge out of the 
console. Take my wallet badge and hold it up out 
with my left hand out the driver's side window to 
where they could see my badge. At that point, 
they stop. My wife said, Why don't you get the 
names of the trucks and file reckless driving 
charges on them? I said, How can I come all the 
way back, lose a day's worth of work, to file a 
reckless driving charges? This just is not 
financially--can't do it. 
We pull in, and we see a trooper and a 
sheriff. And my wife said, Why don't you pull 
over and talk to them? Pull over and tell them. 
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A. B e f o r e he e v e r f o u n d o u t I r e p o r t e d t h e 
i n c i d e n t t o t h e s t a t e him a n d I w e r e f r i e n d s . 
Q. O k a y . 
A. After that point on, he would not speak 
with me at all unless it was work related. He 
told Scott Wilbur and ambulance and firemen in 
Lehi not to trust me and that he did not like me. 
Sergeant Munson also is very proficient on the 
computer and I brought that up to Chief Zimmerman 
that he is one of the most, if not the most, 
proficient person in our police department to 
alter pictures on a computer. To make letters 
3D. And--
Q. Are you accusing him of, o f — 
A. I do not know who did it. 
Q. --drafting these pictures or — 
A. I do not know--
Q• Okay. 
A. --who did it. I know he's very 
proficient on the computer. 
Q. Okay. 
A* He would not--I went with--went to him 
with questions, investigative questions, him being 
the supervisor over detectives. He would 
literally walk away and not even speak with me. 
Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-98S-2180 Toll FVee: 877-441-3180 Fax: 801-985-2181 
Deposition of Douglas Fannen (Vol. 2) 3/22/03 301 
Q. And we're going to talk about your 
emotional--your alleged emotional damages later as 
far as your damage claim goes. But when you say 
that you weren't in the right state of mind when 
you signed this, are you saying as a general 
statement that you really didn't resign? 
A. No, I'm stating that I did not write 
any of this. I remember signing this, and that's 
all I remember. 
Q. You don't remember--
A . Signing thi s. 
Q. --reading this? 
A. No . 
Q. Do you agree—well, let me back up. 
Yesterday you testified that you discussed with Ed 
Collins the terms of your leaving and that Lehi 
City offered one thing and you said no. They 
offered another thing, you said no again. 
Describe those negotiations again for me so that 
we can put that in the context of this letter. 
A. First, when he asked me to resign, I 
told him I would not talk at all in front of 
Chief Zimmerman. He then asked Chief Zimmerman to 
leave the room. 
Q. And this was on June 20, 2001? 
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A. Yes, Ma f am. 
Q. So Ed Collins asked you to resign. 
Chief Zimmerman was present? 
A. During that, yes. 
Q. Okay. And at that time you told--you 
said, I don't want Chief Zimmerman present? 
A. At that time, I stated, I would not 
resign because I had done no wrong. 
Q. And Zimmerman was still present when 
you said that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What was said next? 
A. I then told him I would not resign, and 
I would not talk any further in front of Chief 
Zimmerman because I did not trust him. 
Q. What happened then? After you said, I 
won't talk in front of Chief Zimmerman, what 
happened? 
A. City Manager Collins asked Zimmerman to 
leave and to return to the police department. 
Q. And that, again, was Ed Collins? 
A. Yes . 
Q. So Ed asked Zimmerman to leave? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What happened next? 
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after I reported them to the court — or after I 
reported them to the insurance investigator. 
I advised him of everything. They 
tried to say I rolled my car over. I showed him 
the pictures of my tracks. I offered to him take 
him to where my car was. I proved my case to 
Chief Botkin that I was not the type of officer 
that Lehi was trying to allege me. I also know 
that Lehi did not cooperate with Greene County 
Sheriff's Department during my hiring process. I 
do know firsthand, through the Deputy that called, 
Lehi would not return their phone calls 
whatsoever. 
Q. So despite any alleged, alleged acts on 
behalf of Lehi City while you were trying to 
apply, let's start, with Alpine. With Alpine. 
Despite anything Lehi City did and despite your 
opening up all of your files basically to Alpine, 
none of that stopped Alpine from hiring you? 
A. That was not stopped because of my own 
reputation that I had produced through my 
employment. 
Q. So you had a good reputation? 
A. Yes, Ma'am. 
Q. Lehi City did not harm your reputation? 
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A. Yes, they tried. 
Q. They tried but they didn't succeed? 
A. Due to what I could produce, they could 
not succeed, correct. 
Q. I believe we were back on the 
discussion with pay and benefits. And I want to 
know--we kind of got sidetracked, and I want to 
know what happened after that. After Ed—the last 
thing I have down is that Ed Collins said to you, 
Listen, we won't investigate these allegations 
from Colorado, and we'll give you pay and 
benefits. And I've just got one month's pay and 
benefits at that time. Was that the first offer 
made to you? 
A. Let me go back and add on that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The incident in Colorado was brought up 
just extremely briefly. What they brought up—the 
reason they asked me to resign--they stated that I 
had called a female officer 150-pound, bullet 
stopper. 
Q. And we discussed that yesterday. 
Correct? 
A. Correct but that's in this situation 
right here. 
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attitude. I started to lose weight. 
Q. Okay. While you were working at Lehi 
City? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes . 
Okay . 
I started getting headaches. And I 
just started to become reclusive. 
Q. How l o n g — a n d then I understand—is it 
fair to say that this all--your emotional 
distress — strike that. 
I need to make sure I ask this in a 
fair way for you to understand. You talked about 
the day of your resignation, June 20, 2001, when 
Ed Collins drove you home and you explained being 
very upset that day. Is that part of your 
emotional distress claim? Your--is that one way 
you are claiming you were damaged emotionally? 
A. I was emotionally damaged from the 
point I started getting these allegations, for 
well over a year and a half until the v e r y — 
until, until the end from the beginning till the 
very last day I left the Lehi Police Department. 
Q. Which was June 20, 2001? 
A . Yes, Ma f am. 
Q. Okay. Did your emotional distress 
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d i s t r e s s was b a d e n o u g h t o s e e k c o u n s e l i n g o r 
r e q u i r e y o u r n e e d t o s e e a d o c t o r ? 
A. I was a s k e d t o by my w i f e . Bu t d u e t o 
my f i n a n c e s , I c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o . 
Q. Did you e v e r c h e c k i n t o any s e r v i c e s 
t h a t d o n ' t c o s t money? 
A. No, M a ' a m . 
Q. Did you feel like you needed therapy or 
counseling ? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When you applied to--and I forgotten 
this from yesterday so apologize—I apologize if 
I'm being redundant--but when you applied to 
Alpine, did you have to pass a psychological 
evaluation ? 
A. Yes, Ma'am, written. 
Q. And was that written? 
A. And verbal. 
Q. And verbal. Did you mention either 
on — well, first of all, do you feel like you 
answered every question truthfully on the written 
psychological exam and in the verbal exam? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever mention in the written or 
the verbal part of your exam that you were 
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suffering emotional or mental distress? 
A. I would not comment on any actions that 
Lehi had produced. I refused to comment on that 
with him. 
Q. But I'm not asking about actions that 
Lehi did. Did you ever disclose or make any 
other — any kind of statement on your psyche 
evaluation application, either written or through 
the verbal test, did you say, ever say I am 
suffering emotionally, I feel like I need therapy. 
I feel like I need counseling, anything like that? 
A. No, because when I felt like I needed 
counseling was while I was employed with Lehi 
Police Department. 
Q. So the emotional distress stopped after 
the employment? 
A. It was not comparable to while I was 
being employed there. The stress that I got 
after I left Lehi was I did not know if I would 
even be able to get hired by Alpine/Highland 
because of what they kept saying. 
Q. So by the time you got hired by Alpine, 
the stress was done, and you--when you filled out 
your psyche evaluation, you didn't feel like there 
was anything that was causing you emotional 
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d i s t r e s s ? 
A. The stress was not at the level where 
the psychiatrist felt that I was not fit for 
duty . 
Q. Okay. Did you tell the psychiatrist 
you were suffering emotional distress at any 
level? 
A. I did not comment on any distress I 
felt while I worked at Lehi. I refused to 
comment on any of that. 
Q. Did you tell the, the doctor, whoever 
gave you your verbal part of the test, did you 
tell that individual that you were currently 
suffering any emotional distress? As of the date 
of that test? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you mention anything on the written 
portion of the psyche evaluation that indicated 
that as of that date you were suffering emotional 
or mental distress? 
A. I do not know the outcome of how he 
read that test. I cannot comment on that. 
Q. Explain to me a little bit about the 
test. For instance, is it a true or false 
answer? Do you get to write in explanations 
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June 20, 2001 
Douglas Fannen 
944 North 790 East St. 
Lehi, Utah, 84043 
Edward Collins, City Adminsitrator 
Lehi City Corp. 
153 North 100 East St. 
Lehi, Utah, 84043 
Dear Mr. Collins, 
Please accept this letter as notification of my intent to resign my position of Police 
Officer with the City of Lehi and the other associated duties to which I have been 
assigned. I wish for my resignation to be effective as of September 30, 2001. I am 
moving with my family to accept a new position out of state that I believe will improve 
my opportunities for future professional development Please contact me if you have any 
questions regarding this. 
I have 80 hours of remaining vacation time which I would like to receive in cash as soon 
as possible to assist with moving expenses. We have agreed that my salary and benefits 
will continue to September 30,2001 unchanged from my current status. Unless directed 
otherwise, please hold my check at the City Office for me to pick up. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Douglas Fannen 
000088 
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RULING RE: MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT and 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020402370 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiff sMotion to Strike the Defendants 'Motionfor Summary Judgment, argued before the Court 
on February 26, 2004. The Court, having heard the parties' arguments and reviewed the pleadings 
and being fully advised in the premises, it hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
The Court is unpersuaded to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. The Court respectfully 
disagrees with Plaintiff s contention that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum are "facially insufficient." Specifically, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion and 
Memorandum are adequate under CJA 4-501. 
1 
The Court, however, is persuaded to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court finds that there in no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. URCP 56(c). Specifically, the Court finds that Defendants properly 
referenced the record to support the statement of facts in their supporting Memorandum. CJA 4-
501 (2)(B). The Court notes with emphasis that PlaintifFfailed to oppose or "specifically contradict" 
Defendants' statement of facts, which caused such facts to "be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment." CJA4-501(2)(B). 
STATEMENT OF LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration (CJA) and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (URCP) govern motions for summary judgment.1 Rule 4-501(l)(A) provides, 
in general, that motions shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum and other documents 
relied upon for support. Rule 4-501(2)(A) governs memoranda in support of motions for 
summary judgment and provides, in general, that memoranda shall begin with a concise statement 
of facts in separate numbered sentences that refer specifically to the record. Finally, the intent of 
Rule 4-501 is "[t]o establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court" and "to establish a procedure for expedited dispositions." 
URCP Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the supporting 
Rule 4-501 speaks to all motions. Note that Rule 4-501 was repealed, effective 
November 1, 2003. Relevant provisions from Rule 4-501 were incorporated into URCP Rule 7, 
after the filing date of Defendant's Motion. 
2 
and opposing pleadings and record "show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP Rule 1(a) speaks to the 
scope of the URCP and states that the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting Memorandum because "neither contend there is an absence of genuine issue as to 
any material fact nor make a, prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law." 
Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, p. 2 (unnumbered). Plaintiff 
contends Defendants' Motion and Memorandum are "facially insufficient" and that Plaintiff 
should, therefore, "be excused from responding further." Plaintiff s Memorandum, p. 2 
(unnumbered). 
After a careful review of Defendants' Motion and supporting Memorandum, the Court 
finds that the pleadings comply with CJA 4-501 and URCP 56. The Court observes that the 
Motion was accompanied by & Memorandum that began with a concise statement of facts in 
separate numbered sentences. The recited facts are supported by specific portions of the record. 
While Defendants' Motion failed to "state ... with particularity the relief sought and the grounds 
for the relief sought," as required by URCP 7(b) and argued by Plaintiff in his Motion to Strike, 
Rule 7 was not effective until after the filing date of Defendants' Motion. Moreover, even if Rule 
3 
7 was in effect, a fair and complete reading of Defendants' Motion and the Memorandum would 
satisfy the requirements in light of this Court's liberal construction of the Rules to "secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of [this] action." URCP Rule 1(a). After a careful 
reading of Defendants' Motion, together with the supporting Memorandum and its title, headings 
and subheadings, the Court finds that the pleadings sufficiently communicate the position that 
there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff sMbricw to Strike the Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and its Supporting Memorandum. 
2. Plaintiffs Failure to File Pleadings Specifically Opposing Defendant's Motion 
Before addressing the specifics of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court observes the following. The record is devoid of any pleadings filed on the part of Plaintiff 
wherein he specifically controverts any of the facts as stated in Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion. Accordingly, by CJA 4-501 (2)(B), such unopposed facts of the Motion 
are deemed admitted. Moreover, the Court refers to CJA 4-501(B) wherein a specific 
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is expected. While Plaintiff 
offered objections to Defendants' statement of facts as presented in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment during oral argument, the Court refuses to consider these objections because Plaintiff 
failed to reduce them to pleadings as demanded by the Rule. To consider such objections and 
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arguments is improper because it would put Defendants' counsel in the unfair position of having 
to respond to PlaintifFs arguments without notice, preparation, or opportunity for considered 
analysis and review. Such an occurrence is precisely one the rules of procedure seek to prevent. 
Moreover, arguments presented by counsel in Court, while instructive to clarify a party's position, 
cannot displace an express obligation to make a written response. Here, with Defendants' 
statement of facts being unopposed, they are deemed admitted under the Rule. The pleadings 
having thereafter "closed," such facts cannot then be contradicted or disputed by oral argument. 
This would of course violate the Rules and their objectives for the "just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." URCP 1(a). Respectfully, the Court expresses its strong 
disapproval for PlaintifFs failure to respond to Defendants' Motion with pleadings specifically 
contradicting the facts, especially in light of counsel's well-articulated objections during oral 
argument. 
3. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate in this case because Plaintiff 
has failed to "present sufficient evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him," to 
support his cause. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants'Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 13. The Court is persuaded that Defendants' statement of facts and legal 
arguments, as presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum, 
defeat PlaintifFs claims. The following lists each of the five claims found in PlaintifFs Complaint, 
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followed by Defendants' arguments and a brief analysis of the facts and law to support dismissals. 
Plaintiffs first claim alleges that Defendants engaged in adverse/discriminatory actions 
towards Plaintiff because he reported a suspected violation of the law to an investigator of the 
Workers Compensation Fund [Whistle Blower claim, U.C.A. § 67-21-3(l)(a)]. Complaint \ 45-
46. However, noting the Court's previous analysis, the undisputed facts indicate that Plaintiff 
resigned on June 20, 2001 and did not pursue his claim until February 4, 2002, more that 180 
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation. Defendants' Memorandum in Support, 
Statement of Facts If 10. Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate because, 
pursuant to UCA 67-21-4(2), claims under this chapter must be made within 180 days of the 
alleged violation. Because Plaintiff waited longer than 180 days to file a claim against Defendants 
under this chapter, the Court finds that the claim is barred by time. Accordingly, the Court 
dismisses Plaintiffs first cause of action. 
Plaintiffs second claim alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint \ 
47-48. Defendants argue that Plaintiff "cannot meet the necessary elements to succeed on a claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Defendants' Memorandum in Support, p. 7. In 
support of their argument, Defendants point to the record wherein Plaintiff admits he is unaware 
of who left harassing notes in his mailbox. Memorandum in Support, Statement of Facts % 8. 
Further, Plaintiff acknowledged that any emotional distress he may have suffered ended on the 
date of his resignation. Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Statement for Facts % 12. Finally, 
6 
Defendants point out that during a psychological evaluation for a position with the 
Alpine/Highland P.D., less than five months after he left Lehi City, Plaintiff failed to mention that 
he was suffering from any emotional stress. Defendants' Memorandum in Support, Statement of 
Facts If 15. Taken together, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has failed to marshal 
undisputed facts to link Defendants to the alleged misconduct or present sufficient evidence that 
he suffered emotional distress. 
Plaintiffs third cause of action is constructive termination. Complaint ^ 49-50. 
Defendants counter with the argument that Plaintiff was an employee at-will, meaning Lehi City 
could terminate his employment for any reason absent the following: (1) an implied or express 
agreement between the parties that restricted termination to cause or some other condition; (2) a 
statute or regulation restricting the employer's right to terminate employment under certain 
conditions; or (3) a violation of clear and substantial policy. Burton, M.D. v. Exam Center 
Industrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah 2000). 
First, the Court observes no facts suggesting an implied or express agreement between 
the parties to restrict termination. Second, while Plaintiff argues that Defendants constructively 
terminated his employment by virtue of violating the Whistle Blower act, the Court notes the 
previous discussion and finding that claims under this act are time barred. Third, the Court notes 
Plaintiffs failure to point to any violation of a clear and substantial policy and, after a careful 
review of the facts, the Court finds no such violation. Finally, the Court points to the record 
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wherein Plaintiff was asked to resign and did resign because of the incident in Colorado. 
Memorandum in Support, Statement of Facts % 10-11. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that 
Plaintiff was not constructively terminated but, in fact, voluntarily resigned. 
Plaintiffs fourth cause of action is for defamation, libel and slander. Complaint ^ [ 51-
53. Plaintiff complained that Defendants' "willful and malicious" actions injured his professional 
career as a police officer. Complaint % 52. However, as set forth in Defendants' undisputed 
facts, Plaintiff testified that his good reputation as a police officer was not ruined as a result of the 
alleged misconduct of Defendants. Memorandum in Support, Statement of Facts \ 13. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prove either injury or damages from any alleged misconduct. 
Because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that Defendants participated in the alleged 
misconduct and, further, that his reputation was injured, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fourth 
claim should be dismissed. 
Finally, Plaintiffs fifth cause of action is for attorney's fees and costs. The Court, 
however, dismisses this final claim because Plaintiff has failed to support his other claims and, 
accordingly, is not entitled to reimbursement of fees and/or costs and certainly not entitled to 
punitive damages. 
For these reasons, together with those set forth in Defendants' pleadings, the Court 
grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
8 
Dated this / ? ^ l a y of March 2004. 
Ai^*/ 
SD GEFREDD/ 
istrict Court^dge 
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RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case # 020402370 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial. The Court, 
having reviewed the Plaintiffs motion and Defendants5 opposition thereto and being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
Plaintiff Charles Fannen filed suit after allegedly losing his job in retaliation for contacting 
a Workman's Compensation Fund Fraud Investigator with suspicions that a fellow officer had 
filed a false claim. Plaintiff believes he was adversely treated and constructively terminated 
because of his report to the Workman's Compensation Fund Fraud Investigator. Defendants 
responded to Plaintiffs complaint with a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted 
l 
because Plaintiff failed to answer or dispute any facts set forth in Defendants' motion. Plaintiff 
now requests a new trial. 
Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides seven grounds by which a new trial 
may be granted. Plaintiff alleges that under 59(a)(7), the court committed an error in law by 
failing to timely decide PlaintifFs motion to strike. Oral argument on PlaintifFs Motion to Strike 
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was requested on October 10, 2003 and 
scheduled for February 26, 2004. Although Plaintiff was on notice that both motions would be 
heard on the same day, he chose to rest on his Motion to Strike, Thereafter, the Court ruled on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff s Motion to Strike in favor of 
Defendants on March 17, 2004 - well within the two month time period suggested by Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration Rule 3-111.03(2)(C)(iii)(a). 
In accordance with CJA 4-501(2)(B), which was in effect when Plaintiff submitted his 
Motion to Strike, all factual allegations set forth in a motion for summary judgment that remain 
unopposed are deemed admitted. However, rather than file an opposition to summary judgment 
with supporting affidavits, Plaintiff opted to rely on his Motion to Strike, which motion failed to 
contest a single factual allegation in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Further, Plaintiff was reminded by opposing Counsel of the necessity to 
oppose the motion for summary judgment, yet refused to do so. Once PlaintifFs motion was 
timely denied, there remained nothing of record to dispute the underlying facts of PlaintifFs 
summary judgment motion. For these reasons, there was no error in law to support the present 
motion for new trial, and, therefore, the Court will not grant a new trial on that basis. 
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Plaintiff has also submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New 
Trial/Denial of Summary Judgment arguing that his complaint is not barred by the 180 day 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 67-21-4(2). The Court notes, however, 
that Plaintiff improperly filed this pleading by failing to secure leave from the Court in accordance 
with U.R.C.P. 7(c)(1). Furthermore, the arguments contained in the motion are wholly without 
merit. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations began to run on September 30, 2001 rather 
than June 20, 2001, as suggested by Defendants' motion. To validate his argument, Plaintiff relies 
upon a letter he fails to authenticate by either affidavit or discovery record. Absent such 
authentication, the Court may not consider the letter. By contrast, Defendants attached to their 
memorandum the deposition record of Plaintiffs testimony, in which Plaintiff clearly states, under 
oath, that he left the Lehi Police Department on June 20, 2001. Deposition of Charles Douglas 
Fannen, Volume II pg. 353. Without supporting affidavit or discovery record to dispute 
Defendants' factual representations, they are deemed admitted and Plaintiffs claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations. The Court is, therefore, unpersuaded by Plaintiff § Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for a New Trial/Denial of Summary Judgment. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court respectfully denies Plaintiffs Motion for a New 
Trial Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
-\ 
Dated this / < £ day of Jpae 2004. 
BY THE COURT: ^UF?/v, 
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